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COMMENTS
EMINENT DOMAIN: DEPRECIATED REPRODUCTION COST
IN THE VALUATION OF TRADE FIXTURES
In recent years, the power of eminent domain has been exercised fre-
quently As growing numbers of private and corporate citizens have be-
come embroiled in condemnation proceedings, concern has developed
regarding the suitability of various methods of valuation used to com-
pensate the owners of condemned property Traditionally, courts have
determined awards on the basis of the "market value" of the con-
demned property, using evidence of sales of comparable properties in
order to determine "market value." 1 In many instances, however, the
absence of comparable sales renders this method unworkable and mequi-
table. Furthermore, when the property includes trade fixtures, the dif-
ficulty of applying the traditional valuation formula becomes even more
difficult. As a result, some courts have reevaluated traditional "market
value" determimatives and have turned to a valuation based on repro-
duction cost-less depreciation.
Tins Comment will examine the various methods used for valuation
of trade fixtures. Emphasis will be placed on the use of depreciated re-
production costs, and suggested uniform criteria for the application of
this valuation method will be posited from existing case law
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE FIXTURES AS CONDEMNABLE PROPERTY
At common law, everything attached to realty was considered a part
of it.2 The law of trade fixtures developed as an exception to this gen-
eral rule in order to protect the rights of leaseholders who had added
fixtures to the property and who otherwise would have surrendered the
value of such improvements upon termination of the lease.3 The lessee
was permitted to retain "removable" fixtures such as machinery, heavy
equipment, custom-built installations, and other business objects-com-
1. For a discussion of the traditional approach to ermnent domain and the resulting
valuation problems, see Hershman, Eminent Domain: Current Concepts and Practical
Problems, in A PRAcTIcAL GumE TO Tm LEAAL AND APPRAIsAL ASPECts OF CONDEMNATION
3 (S. Searles ed. 1969).
2. KENT's COMmENTAmEs 467 (12th ed. 1873).
3. See In re Mayor, 39 App. Div. 589, 57 N.Y.S. 657 (App. Div. 1899).
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monly called trade fixtures-so long as the removal of such items would
not injure the property 4
The common law provided that when fixtures attached to the realty
were condemned in eminent domain proceedings, the owner received
compensation; this was fair, since a failure to compensate would have
amounted to a confiscation of property 5 The common law did not con-
sider whether trade fixtures, which by definition are removable, were
condemnable. In modern times, however, condemnation of trade fix-
tures has become common. Despite the fact that the owner of such fix-
tures could remove them from the appropriated realty, it is clear that in
some instances the fixture bears such a relation to the condemned realty
that the fixture by itself would be valueless. In these instances, a taking
of the realty also amounts to a compensable "taking" of the fixture even
though the fixture could be removed by its owner, who may be either
a lessee0 or a condemnee who owns both the realty and the fixtures.7
Although it is well established that trade fixtures may require com-
pensation when the underlying realty is condemned, the circumstances
which demand such compensation are unclear. There are several tests
used to determine when trade fixtures are condemnable, and some of
them appear to be mconsistent. Frequently, the tests involve the same
inquiries which are necessary to a determination of whether the objects
are removable. One court has summarized the operative principles as
follows:
Fixtures are classified as "removable" unless they are "distinctly
realty" They are distinctly realty if they would be severely dam-
aged or lose substantially all their value upon severance . Re-
movable fixtures are compensable unless they are "removable with
such little difficulty or loss in value as to have retained [their]
personal character. 8
4. Removable fixtures, such as machinery and other business objects, are called trade
fixtures. See generally M. EWELL, ON Fixrurs ch. IV (1876).
5. United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180 (1910); Allen v. Boston, 137 Mass. 319
(1884); Jackson v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (1914).
6. See Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 606, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963). In
this case involving the condemnation of a number of small businesses, the court held that
the tenant was entitled to the award not because the trade fixtures added value to the
leasehold, but because they belonged to the tenant and their value represented one com-
ponent of the value of property taken by the city.
7. In such cases the courts usually refer to the trade fixtures as "business objects." This
Comment will use the terms synonymously. Compare Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285,
189 N.E.2d 606, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963), 'with United States v. Certain Properties, 388
F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1968).
8. Umtd States v. Certain Properties, 388 F.2d 596, 598 n.1 (2d Cir. 1968).
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This test appears to be a combination of two basic approaches winch
courts have taken in determining whether trade fixtures are condemn-
able. The first of these approaches is an application of the common law
test set forth in Teaff v. Heitt,9 which would allow compensation for
those items which conform to the common law definition of fixtures,
notwithstanding the fact that they may also be "removable" trade fix-
tures under the law of landlord and tenant. In applying this test, em-
phasis is placed on the intention of the parties, the use to which the item
has been put, and whether there has been "actual" annexation to the
realty By contrast, in the second approach emphasis is placed upon
more practical economic considerations. Courts adopting this analysis
allow compensation for any improvements used for business purposes
if severance would destroy the fixture's value.' 0 Accordingly, courts
have allowed compensation for the following items: those having a
high cost of removal," those winch were custom-built and are not a part
of a readily ascertainable sales market,12 and those which are part of an
economic unit which would be rendered inoperable if separate parts
were severed.13
In most instances, the economic approach is preferable; it allows an
equitable settlement of compensation while avoiding the difficult prob-
lem of determining winch improvements are affixed to the realty in such
a manner as to become part of the condemned property 1 4
VALUATION
The Unit Rule
After a determination that a trade fixture is condemnable, it is neces-
sary to consider what types of evidence are admissible to show valua-
tion. Separate valuation of trade fixtures is not allowed by those courts
that subscribe to the controversial "unit rule," winch requires that the
land, buildings, and fixtures be valued as a unit. This rule is based on the
9. 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853). For a general discussion of the tests applied to trade fixtures,
see Smtzer, Valuation and Condemnation Problems Involvmg Trade Fixtures, 16 VILL
L. Rxv. 467, 490-91 (1971).
10. In re Seward Park Slum Clearance Project, 10 App. Div. 2d 498, 200 N.Y.S.2d 802
(App. Div. 1961).
11. E.g., Rose v. State, 24 N.Y.2d 80, 246 N.E.2d 735 (1969) (loss of value due to high
costs in removing machinery used in ready-mix concrete and crushed stone business).
12. Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 606, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963)
13. E.g., Singer v. Oil City Redevelopment Authority, 437 Pa. 55, 261 A.2d 594 (1970);
Gottus v. Allegheny County Redevelopment Authority, 425 Pa. 584, 229 A.2d 869 (1967).
14. Smtzer, supra note 9, at 496-97.
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theory that compensation for the taking of property should be no greater
than the market value for the unit as it stands.'t Thus, evidence showing
a trade fixture's separate value is inadmissible. The rule has come under
much criticism, however, because of its inherent unfairness, and most
courts appear to be abandoning it.'6
Depreciated Reproduction Cost
If the trade fixture is compensable and the unit rule does not bar evi-
dence of its separate value, the court must consider what kinds of evi-
dence are appropriate to facilitate a fair determination of value. How-
ever, because of the infinite variety of circumstances in which market
value must be ascertained, there is no general rule or method for its de-
termination.'7 Further problems arise when there is no ascertainable
15. "The claimant is entitled to compensation, not merely for so much land, so much
brick, lumber, materials, and machinery, considered separately; but if they have been
combined, adjusted, synchronized, and perfected into an efficient functioning unit of
property, then it must be paid for that unit, so combined " Banner Mill Co. v.
State, 240 N.Y. 533, 544, 148 N.E. 668, 672 (1925). See also Kinter v. United States, 156
F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1946); Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P.2d 826 (1933); Chicago
v. Farwell, 286 IlM. 415, 121 N.E. 795 (1918); Williams v. Commonwealth, 168 Mass. 364,
47 N.E. 115 (1897).
16. See generally Annot., I A.L .2d 878, 902-03 (1948); United States v. City of New
York, 165 F.2d 526, 528 (2d Cir. 1948). One situation which linuts the use of the unit
rule is found in landlord-tenant cases. If the unit rule were applied, the award to the
tenants would be no more than the amount by which the entire building, including
fixtures, was valued-a small award when divided proportionately among many tenants.
In the leading case of Marraro v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 606, 239 N.YS.2d 105
(1963), the court, after determining that the fixtures were compensable to the tenants
as trade fixtures, held that equity required a separate consideration of the value of these
fixtures to achieve just compensation. The value of the fixtures as separate units en-
hancing the whole was found to be a more accurate method of determining the value
of the fixture to the individual tenants whose interests were being taken. Thus the basis
for separation of value is two-fold: a recognition of the equitable nature of just com-
pensation by attempting to give the owner of a fixture an accurate value of its worth,
and a recognition of the economic realities of modern appraisal methods which often
consider separate component costs, even when the language of the court is in terms
of the unit rule.
17. In fact, the rules in this area of eminent domain appear conflicting. For example,
a Connecticut court states that no single method is controlling, and that all factors must
be considered, while a Louisiana court holds that the depreciated reproduction cost
method may be used only where there is no evidence of comparable sales involving
similar improvements. Compare Moss v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 146 Conn.
421, 151 A.2d 693 (1959), 'wttb State Dept. of Highways v. Poulyn, 160 So. 2d 387 (La.
Ct. App. 1964). A New York court does not allow the depreciated reproduction cost
method unless the building in question is a specialty or unique, while m Washington
this method may be employed whenever the building is suited to its appurtenant land.
Compare City of Binghamton v. Rosefsky, 29 App. Div. 2d 820, 287 N.Y.S.2d 249 (App.
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market at all-a difficulty which often arises when trade fixtures are in-
volved.'8 In such cases, other methods of valuation must be employed.
One such method seeks to determine value by ascertaining the depreci-
ated reproduction cost of the condemned fixture.' Since this method
generally yields a high measure of compensation, its use frequently is
urged by claimants. "0 Many courts seem reluctant to consider depreci-
ated reproduction costs-and will use the method only in narrowly de-
fined circumstances-while others are willing to admit such costs as evi-
dence of value even where a market value could be determined by other,
more traditional means.
In United States v. Certain Properties, 2 the justification for using de-
preciated reproduction cost2 2 was explained by Judge Friendly substan-
tially as follows: Normally, just compensation is assured through an ap-
plication of the market value method, using evidence of a fairly con-
temporaneous sale of comparable property as a basis for the award. But
when such evidence is not procurable, the court must endeavor to re-
construct what a hypothetical purchaser would pay for the trade fixture
for use in the premises being condemned. It is assumed that such a pur-
chaser would pay no more than the current cost of comparable new fix-
Div. 1968), 'with State v. Wilson, 6 Wash. App. 433, 493 P.2d 1252 (1972). Equally con-
fusing is the reasoning of the courts, often consisting of little more than the recitation
of some equitable terms such as "just compensation," and "fairness." State v. Braddock,
160 So. 2d 279 (La. Cr. App. 1964). See generally I J. BONDRIGHT, VALUATION OF PRoP-
ERTY 54-65 (1937).
18. See United States v. Certain Properties, 388 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1968).
19. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 6 Wash. App. 433, 493 P.2d 1252 (1972). Other ap-
proaches involve reference to comparable sales, which will be treated later in the text,
and to capitalization of income. Income capitalization-the present value of the future
earnings foregone by the taking of the property in question-is another method of de-
termining market value winch has been accepted by some courts. See, e.g., In re James
Madison Houses, 17 App. Div. 2d 317, 234 N.Y.S.2d 799 (App. Div. 1962). Other courts,
however, consider the speculative nature of future income to be significant; thus the
use of this type of evidence should be limited. E.g., State v. Bare, 141 Mont. 288, 377
P.2d 357 (1962). For a further discussion of this valuation method see 4 P NiciHoLs, THE
LAw OF EMIN r DOMAIN § 12.3121 [3] (rev. 3d ed. 1964).
20. Searles, The Legal and Appraisal Aspects of Specialty Properties, in PRAcTIcAL
GuiDn To THE LEGAL AND APPRAIsAL AspEcrs OF CONDEMNATION 65, 66 (S. Searles ed. 1969).
21. 388 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1968).
22. Courts often treat the terms "reproduction cost" and "replacement cost" similarly
in arriving at an amount of compensation. Although used interchangeably, there is a
significant difference between them. Reproduction cost is the cost of replacing the sub-
ject improvement with one that is an exact replica. Replacement cost is the cost of re-
placing the property new with allowance for the depreciation of the fixture. For a
detailed discussion of these terms, see Smith, Legal Aspects of the Cost Approach, 31
ArA. LAwYER 473 (1969).
REPRODUCTION COST
tures less an appropriate allowance for deterioration from use and ob-
solescence.23
Although the validity of the depreciated reproduction cost method
is generally accepted, a uniform test of its applicability has not been fash-
ioned. Any discussion of depreciated reproduction cost would be in-
complete without an analysis of the limitations which have been-and
should be-placed upon its use.
Linitations on the Use of Depreczated Reproduction Cost
1 Use of Comparable Sales
Many courts advance the position that the best evidence of market
value is the sales price of comparable property Accordingly, they con-
clude that if evidence of relevant comparable sales is available, evidence
of depreciated reproduction cost in valuing trade fixtures is madmissi-
ble. Although relevancy presents many problems which are beyond the
scope of this discussion, it may be noted that relevancy generally is de-
termmed by examining four basic elements: geographical proximity,
proximity in time, similarity in quality, and similarity of market condi-
tions.24 Thus, if these elements are present, evidence of comparable sales
is admissible to show value, and the use of other methods of valuation,
such as depreciated reproduction cost, is disallowed.
By contrast, other courts have demonstrated a willingness to examine
evidence of depreciated reproduction cost even if evidence of relevant
comparable sales is available.23 It is argued that such evidence should
be admitted because it tends to show what price a hypothetical purchaser
would be willing to pay for the condemned property 26
It is submitted that if evidence of a comparable sale exists, the depre-
ciated reproduction cost should not be examied. A court should base
its finding of value on concrete market evidence, rather than on a hypo-
thetical buyer's propensity to pay a speculative sum. The American Bar
Association, recognizing the superiority of this approach, has stated:
"[T]he best method of arriving at market value is the use of recent
23. 388 F.2d at 600.
24. Sengstock & McAuliffe, What is the Price of Eminent Domain?, 44 J. Uaa~r L.
185 (1966) See also Commonwealth v. Oakland Umted Bapust Church, 372 S.W.2d
412 (Ky. 1963); In re Armory Site, 282 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 1955); People v. Rivera, 70
P.R.R. 292 (1949).
25. Sengstock & McAuliffe, supra note 24, at 224.
26. Id.
1972]
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[actual] sales of comparable property " 27 Accordingly, the lack of ade-
quate comparable sales evidence should be a prerequisite to the use of de-
preciated reproduction cost.
2. Reasonableness of Replacement and Specialties
Even assuming a lack of adequate comparable sales data, many courts
impose further limitations on the use of depreciated reproduction cost.
For example, some courts require that the condemned improvement be
unique or a "specialty" before reproduction costs can be used. 8 This
prerequisite is in many instances another way of viewing the comparable
sale requirement. Thus, if an object is peculiar or unique, it is logical
to conclude that there will not be evidence sufficient to establish a com-
parable sale. The concept of specialty is explained in the following man-
ner:
It occasionally happens that a parcel of real estate taken by
eminent domain is of such a nature, or is held or has been improved
in such a manner, that, while it serves a useful purpose to the
owner, if he desired to dispose of it he would be unable to sell it
at anything like its real value. A church, or a college building, or
a club-house located in a town mn which there was but one religious
society, or college, or club, might be worth all it cost to the own-
ers, but it would be absolutely unmarketable. So, also, in many
states an owner of land abutting upon a public street might be
satisfied with the fact that he owned the fee of the street, and was
thus able to protect himself against the use of the street for other
than street purposes without compensation; but it would be almost
impossible for him to sell his interest in the street to a private pur-
chaser. Even such a piece of property as a mill site or a reservoir
site, or a factory or store of abnormal size may to a somewhat lesser
degree, be difficult to dispose of, though of great value to its
owner.2
The mere finding that condemned personalty is unique and virtually
unmarketable should not, however, lead automatically to a conclusion
27. ABA CoMM. ON CONDEMNATION AND CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE OF THE SECTION OF
LOcAL Gov MmiENT LAW 38 (1962). But see Kansas City & T. Ry v. Vickroy, 46 Kan.
248, 26 P. 698 (1891); In re Civic Center, 335 Mich. 528, 56 N.W.2d 375 (1953);
Minneapolis-St. P. Sanitary Dist. v. Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn. 442, 277 N.W 394 (1937).
28. E.g., United States v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962) (admission of
the replacement cost of a building as evidence refused due to lack of uniqueness).
29. P. NichoLs, supra note 19, § 12.32 at 217-38.
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that evidence of its depreciated reproduction cost is best suited to de-
termine its value. Courts should also consider whether it would be rea-
sonable for an owner to replace his special object with a substitute. The
need for such an inquiry was illustrated in In re Lincoln Square Slum
Clearance Project.3" There, the court posited an obsolete lighthouse as an
example to demonstrate that the depreciated reproduction cost method
is not always applicable to specialties. The court hypothesized that a
condemned lighthouse, although umque, probably would not be replaced.
Hence, in such a situation the owner should not recover replacement
costs.
Other decisions have elucidated the concept of "reasonableness" of
replacement. State v. Wilson,31 for example, states that one indication
of reasonableness is whether a replacement may be suited to the land on
which it is to be located. Another factor, discussed in United States v.
Bubler,32 is the likelihood that a hypothetical purchaser would repro-
duce the improvement after purchasing the realty
The need to consider the reasonableness of replacement is aptly illus-
trated by the result reached by one court which failed to employ this
limitation. In Port of New York Authority v. Hudson Tubes Corp.,3i
the court awarded compensation in excess of what "anybody in his right
mind would reasonably have paid" for the improvement.34 Instead of
deciding that the unprofitable nature of the business would render its
replacement unreasonable, thereby limiting the award to the price for
which the property could be sold on the existing market, the court fash-
ioned a larger award in order to avoid "manifest injustice." 8 5 Compen-
sation for an unprofitable inprovement, however, is not "just compensa-
tion," since the award must also be fair to the condemning authority 6
Although the preceding cases did not concern trade fixtures, it may be
suggested by analogy that reasonableness of replacement be uniformly
adopted as a prerequisite to the use of depreciated reproduction cost in
valuing condemned trade fixturesY.8
30. I App. Div. 2d 153, 222 N.Y.S.2d 786 (App. Div. 1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 1086,
190 N.E.2d 423, 240 N.Y.S. 30 (1963).
31. 6 Wash. App. 443, 493 P.2d 1252 (1972).
32. 305 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1962).
33. 20 N.Y.2d 457, 231 N.E2d 734, 285 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1967).
34. Searles, supra note 20, at 70.
35. Port of N.Y. Authority v. Hudson Tubes Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 457, 468, 231 N.E.2d
734, 738, 285 N.Y.S.2d 24, 30 (1967).
36. Umnted States v. Delaware, Lackawanna & W Ry, 264 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1959).
37. See e.g., Umted States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 102 F Supp. 854 (SD.N.Y.
1972]
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3. Cost of Removal
A third limitation on the use of the depreciated reproduction cost in
valuing trade fixtures is found in decisions which restrict condemnation
awards to the lesser of two dollar amounts-either the depreciated re-
production cost of the condemned personalty, or the cost of removing
the fixture from the condemned realty Although courts traditionally
have refused to allow removal costs,38 the equity of an approach using
cost of removal as its basis has been presumed in recent state and federal
statutes.3 9 It also has been affirmed in court decisions.
In Rose v. State,40 a condemnation proceeding involved a crushed stone
and ready-mix concrete business which used heavy machinery The
court held that the state was required to pay either replacement costs
less depreciation or the costs of removal, whichever was less, stating- "If
the cost of removal is less than the difference between salvage value and
present value in place, this is all the claimant is entitled to recover. The
State is not required to place a claimant in a better position than he was
before the taking by helping him to finance a new facility" 41
A subsequent decision, City of Buffalo v. I W Clement Co.,42 extends
this approach by stating that the condemnee has an actual duty to miti-
gate his damage by removing his trade fixtures. Although the courts in
Rose and City of Buffalo take a realistic view of condemnation law by
considering both equitable and economic factors, they failed to address
the following problem: If an owner has fixtures, only some of which are
removable, and the removable fixtures are of little value apart from the
1952), aff'd sub izom. United States v. Kmckerbocker Printing Corp., 212 F.2d 894 (2d
Cir.), cert. demed, 348 U.S. 875 (1954). "[Tlrade fixtures, in effect, are considered as
improvements to the realty" 102 F Supp. at 858.
38. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373 (1945). The court stated
that condemnation awards are restricted to the value of the object, and refused to-con-
sider consequential damages such as removal costs.
39. See, e.g., Chapter V of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. §§ 501-12
(1970), amending 23 U.S.C. §§ 501-12 (Supp. V, 1968); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 13a-73
(1963).
40. 24 N.Y.2d 80, 246 NYE.2d 735, 298 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1969)
41. Id. at 83, 246 N.E.2d at 740, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
42. 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 NE.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1970). In this case involving the
condemnation of a prmting company, the court held that where machinery in a con-
demned building was an integral part of the business, but was movable at less cost than
its value in place, the city was required to pay only removal costs. The court reasoned
that a condemnee is entitled only to be put in as good a position as he had occupied
before the condemnation. This theory is not viable, however, in a situation where such
machinery cannot be relocated .pr used in a fully operating unit.
[Vol. 14.430
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complete industrial unit, an award which would force the owner to re-
move these fixtures in mingation of damages would yield an mequitable
result.
This problem was ameliorated in Singer v. Oil City Redevelopment
Authorty43 in which the court adopted an industrial unit approach, al-
lowing removal costs only when the removable fixtures would constitute
an operating unit, and where a location for these fixtures was available.
When both of these conditions are met, and the cost of removal is less
than the depreciated reproduction cost of the fixtures, the replacement
cost less depreciation should not be awarded.
This approach suggests one solution to the City of Buffalo problem,
since it considers the value of a trade fixture in relation to the entire op-
erational umt. The problem of forced removal of trade fixtures which
have a removal cost lower than their replacement cost when there
is no guarantee that they will be relocated is solved by Singer- the
ability to relocate as a full operating unit is a precondition to forced
removal. This approach is economically fair to the owner since he is
placed in the same position he occupied before removal; he continues to
have the use of his trade fixtures in an operating unit. It also serves the
interests of the condemnor, since it will mean smaller condemnation
awards when such cost is less than the reproduction cost less deprecia-
non. In terms of the equitable and economic considerations underscor-
ing the law of condemnation of fixtures, this appears to be a valid limita-
tion on the depreciated reproduction cost method.
CONCLUSION
Although the law of fixtures is not completely clear, some rules for
determining the value of condemned trade fixtures have emerged in re-
cent cases. Specifically, in determining whether the depreciated repro-
duction cost method is applicable to the valuation of business objects, the
courts must first determine that the items are indeed trade fixtures, and
hence compensable. Next, the court must find the unit rule inapplicable,
thus permitting the use of a method of compensation which values fix-
tures separately Finally, it can be concluded that the use of the depre-
ciated reproduction cost method for the valuation of trade fixtures gen-
erally provides just compensation, but its use is subject to several limita-
tions. Specifically, this method of valuation should be available only
where: (1) there is inadequate evidence of comparable sales, (2) the
43. 437 Pa. 55, 261 A.2d 594 (1970).
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fixtures could be replaced reasonably, and (3) the cost of removal would
not reasonably compensate the condemnee. Uniform judicial acceptance
of these tests to determine the applicability of depreciated reproduction
cost evidence in the valuation of condemned trade fixtures would add
rationality and fairness to an unsettled area of the law
